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ABSTRACT
One of today’s main challenge related to cloud storage is to
maintain the functionalities and the efficiency of customers’
and service providers’ usual environments while protecting
the confidentiality of sensitive data. Deduplication is one of
those functionalities: it enables cloud storage providers to
save a lot of memory by storing only once a file uploaded
several times. However, classical encryption schemes block
deduplication. One needs to use a “message-locked encryp-
tion” scheme (MLE), which allows the detection of dupli-
cates and the storage of only one encrypted file on the server,
which can be decrypted by any owner of the file. However,
in most existing scheme, a user can bypass this deduplica-
tion protocol. In this article, we provide servers verifiability
for MLE schemes: the servers can verify that the ciphertexts
are well-formed. This property forces a customer to prove
that she complied to the deduplication protocol, thus pre-
venting her to deviate from the prescribed functionality of
MLE. Then, we provide an MLE scheme satisfying this new
security property. To achieve the deduplication consistency,
our construction primarily relies on zero-knowledge proofs.
Unlike Abadi et al.’s MLE, we instantiate those proofs, so
that we obtain a more efficient scheme, secure in the random
oracle model.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is often promoted towards compa-
nies as a way to reduce their costs while increasing ac-
cessibility and flexibility. It is common sense to have one
large computing infrastructure that companies would
share instead of replicating smaller ones. This saves
money and is an eco-friendlier way to distribute re-
sources. But cloud platforms are neither cheap nor eco-
friendly. The larger amount of data these platforms
host, the more expensive they become. Impact on the
environment grows as well. One way to address this
issue is to delete identical files stored on the server by
different users. This method, called deduplication, is
widely used by cloud providers.
However, some of the cloud storage users may want
to encrypt their data, distrusting an honest-but-curious
cloud provider. If they use a classical secure encryp-
tion scheme, deduplication is not possible anymore: two
encryptions of the same plaintext under different keys
naturally yield indistinguishable ciphertexts. New kind
of encryption is needed, under which it is possible to
determine whether two different ciphertexts are locked
to the same message or not.
Previous Work.
The work on the message-locked encryption model
has been initiated by Douceur et al. [5] with their con-
vergent encryption (CE) scheme. The main idea is very
simple: everyone that encrypts the same message m will
obtain the same ciphertext c. It is worth describing it,
since it is simple and illustrates pretty well the different
security issues. The convergent encryption protocol CE
given in [5] uses a hash function H (which is modelled
as a random oracle for the security proof) and a deter-
ministic symmetric encryption scheme SE: it sets the
encryption and decryption key as K = H(M), where
M is the message to be encrypted, and the ciphertext
C is computed as SE.Encrypt(M,K). The ciphertext is
concatenated to a tag τ = H(C) which allows the server
to easily detect duplicates. When the server receives a
new ciphertext, it discards the file if the tag equals one
already in its database.
In [3], authors point out the lack of a formal secu-
rity investigation of this emerging model. They for-
mally introduce the concept of message-locked encryp-
tion (MLE) and provide a complete security analysis. In
particular, they show that a secure MLE does not need
to be deterministic to achieve its goal. It is sufficient
(and more general) to provide an equality testing proce-
dure that publicly checks if two ciphertexts encrypt the
same plaintext, as shown in [1]. The interactive case
has recently been studied in [2].
Security.
As other kinds of“searchable encryption”, MLE stands
at the boundary of deterministic and probabilistic en-
cryption worlds. As such, it cannot provide the stan-
dard notions of semantic security. Likewise, security
can only be achieved for unpredictable data (having
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high min-entropy). If one can guess a possible mes-
sage, one can encrypt it and then easily test ciphertexts
for equality. But, as pointed out previously, determinis-
tic encryption is too restrictive. In previous works two
privacy properties (PRV for short) were defined, both
stating that privacy should hold for an adversary being
able to choose the distribution where the messages are
drawn (hence the notion of CDA, for Chosen Distribu-
tion Attack). In the PRV$-CDA [3] experiment, the
adversary has to distinguish a ciphertext according to
a distribution of its choice from a random bit sequence.
The PRV-CDA2 [1] adds the parameter dependence set-
ting, for which the security should hold even for mes-
sages that depend on the public parameters. They are
then given to the adversary who chooses a distribution.
Abadi et al. [1] have also slightly modified the secu-
rity experiment, compared to [3], introducing a real-or-
random oracle that gives to the encryption algorithm
either a set of (unpredictable) messages drawn from the
adversary’s chosen distribution, or a true randomly cho-
sen set of (unpredictable) messages. The adversary has
to distinguish between both cases.
In addition, authors in [3], introduce the natural re-
quirement of tag consistency, whose goal is to make it
impossible to undetectably replace a message by a fake
one. It states that if two tags are equal, then underlying
messages should be equal.
Our contributions.
In this article, we investigate the converse: if two mes-
sages are equal, does the server always perform dedu-
plication? Strangely enough, in almost all previous CE
and MLE schemes [5, 3, 2], it is straightforward for
a user to avoid the deduplication process altogether.
The main feature for which those schemes were intro-
duced, namely deduplication, is not achieved. In those
schemes, the server does not actually verify that the key
has actually been computed as required. In order to
achieve verifiability in MLE, we introduce a new notion
of deduplication consistency. It states that an equality
test run on two valid ciphertexts with the same underly-
ing plaintext will output 1 with overwhelming probabil-
ity. Verifiability is a classical notion to prevent denial-
of-service attacks, but this can be also useful in some
scenarios. A court could oblige a cloud service provider
to delete all copies of a given file, for example a news-
paper article (right-to-be-forgotten) or a media file (for
copyright infringement). If users are able to escape the
deduplication process, the cloud service provider would
not be able to prove that he complied to the court de-
cision.
Another issue in cloud storage is efficiency, as people
usually expect instant uploading and responses from the
cloud storage provider. The equality testing should be
fast enough to fulfil this requirement. Moreover, the ci-
phertexts’ expansion should be carefully controlled, as
the deduplication main goal is to save space storage. As
such, neither the generic non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof (NIZK) used in [1] nor fully homomorphic encryp-
tion used in [2] could be considered as acceptable solu-
tions.
In this paper, we propose a new, deduplication-consistent
construction for message-locked encryption in the random-
oracle model. As we use NIZK to ensure verifiability,
the PRV$-CDA property is not adapted to our scheme.
However, as we are not parameter-independent, we mod-
ify the PRV-CDA2 property to suit our scheme. Thus,
we define the parameter independant PRV-piCDA secu-
rity notion, that requires as PRV-CDA2 that encryptions
of random messages should be undistinguishable from
encryptions of messages drawn from a chosen distribu-
tion, but, the public parameters of the scheme are hid-
den from the adversary (as in the PRV$-CDA game).
As explained in [1], a natural way to provide the ver-
ifiability of a ciphertext in a scheme of e.g. [5], is to
provide a NIZK proof that the key K = H(M) is cor-
rectly computed from the message M , and the cipher-
text C = SE.Encrypt(M,K) is also consistent w.r.t. the
same message M and key K. But a NIZK on a non-
NP language is not possible, and the hash function H
here needs to be a random oracle, which is not an NP
language. The solution proposed in [1] consists in using
a costly cut-and-choose technique to overcome the ran-
dom oracle and a generic NIZK over circuits [6], applied
to a hash function which does not need to be a random
oracle. To achieve our goal, we propose a different strat-
egy. Firstly, we do not use a standard hash function,
but one having algebraic properties, for which we prove
that the resulting output (the key in our case) is indis-
tinguishable from a random one, using the leftover-hash
lemma. We then use a variant of the ElGamal encryp-
tion scheme for small messages and also apply a tag
construction similar to the one given in [1]. All this
eventually makes it possible to use efficient NIZK over
discrete logarithm relation sets [9, 7] to prove that these
computations are all consistent one with each other.
Organization of the paper.
The paper is now organized as follows. In the next
section, we introduce our new notion of deduplication
consistency and Section 3 describes our new construc-
tion.
2. DEDUPLICATION CONSISTENCY
In precedent works, the main security requirement,
besides privacy, was tag consistency, meaning that if
the equality test EQ(c1, c2) outputs 1 on two cipher-
texts, then the underlying plaintexts are the same. As
sketched in the introduction, we tackle here the converse
case: if two ciphertexts c1 and c2 are meant to encrypt
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the same message, we require that EQ(c1, c2) outputs
1 with overwhelming probability. To capture such se-
curity issue, we introduce in the following a new secu-
rity notion for message-locked encryption, called dedu-
plication consistency. This notion ensures that a MLE
schemes provably provides deduplication.
2.1 Overview
The main point of deduplication consistency is to
make a MLE scheme “verifiable”. In fact, if a server
makes use of an MLE scheme for which it cannot be
convinced that deduplication is actually enforced, he
will loose the benefit he has expected from deduplica-
tion. In most existing schemes indeed (see below), only
users are responsible for a smooth deduplication pro-
cess. Then these schemes can easily be “deviate[d] from
[their] prescribed functionality”1.
In addition to save space storage, verifiable dedupli-
cation is a functionality that can have an interest of
its own. Today, a really hot topic is the right-to-be-
forgotten. An important question related to this topic
is how a server can prove that he really deleted some
given files. The problem is even more difficult if the
files are encrypted on the server: the right to privacy of
a user cannot prevail over the right to privacy of other
users. It can happen however that a court asks a cloud
service provider to remove a defamatory newspaper ar-
ticle or video from its storage space. Then the server’s
manager could encrypt this specific file with a verifiable
MLE scheme and match it against the other files in the
server. If the equality test returns one, deleting the cor-
responding file will be be sufficient to prove that no user
can now access to this file, as no user can bypass the
deduplication procedure.
2.2 Deduplication Consistency in Related Work
Considering the different solutions given by Bellare et
al. [3], it is clear that all the CE, HCE1, HCE2, RCE, XHC
and SXH schemes do not achieve such a property. In CE,
the tag is computed as τ = H(C), where K = H(M)
and C = SE(K,M). In all the other schemes, the tag
τ is equivalent to some F(F(M)), where F can here be
either a hash function (see HCE1, HCE2, RCE), an ex-
traction (see XHC) or a projection (see SXH) function.
Then, an attacker can instead just randomly choose the
key K so that she will be able to decrypt, although the
tag comparison will always output false. In all these
schemes, the server never verifies that the key used to
encrypt the message is the same as the one used to com-
pute the tag: a user can always cheat with the dedupli-
cation protocol.
Abadi et al. [1] have proposed two schemes. Their
fully randomized scheme bonds together the key, the
1Oded Goldreich, The Foundations of Cryptography, Pref-
ace.
Experiment ExpDCΠ,A(λ)
pp← PPGen(1λ);
(M, c0, c1)← A(1λ, pp);
If (Valid(pp, c0) = 0) ∨ (Valid(pp, c1) = 0) then return 0;
If EQ(pp, c0, c1) = 1 then return 0;
kM ← KD(pp,M);
M0 ← Dec(pp, kM , c0) ; M1 ← Dec(pp, kM , c1);
If M 6= M0 ∨M 6= M1 then return 0;
Return 1;
Figure 1: Deduplication Security Game :
ExpDCΠ,A(λ)
message, the tag and the ciphertexts, making each one
of them consistent with all the others, with a zero-
knowledge proof. We have thus the intuition that this
scheme is deduplication consistent. There is no such
relation between the message, the key, the ciphertext,
and the tag in the proposed deterministic scheme.
2.3 Formal Definition
We define the deduplication experiment ExpDCΠ,A(1
λ)
described on Figure 1.
Definition 1 (Deduplication consistency). An
MLE scheme Π is deduplication consistent if for any
probabilistic polynomial-time A, there exists a negligible
function ν(λ) such that:
AdvDCΠ,A(λ) = Pr
[
ExpDCΠ,A = 1
]
≤ ν(λ),
where the random experiment ExpDCΠ,A(1
λ) is described
in Figure 1.
3. A MESSAGE LOCKED ENCRYPTION WITH
DEDUPLICATION CONSISTENCY
In this section, we describe our construction of a
deduplication consistent MLE. Compared to the fully
randomized message-locked encryption from [1], the main
difference is that the secret key is derived from the mes-
sage using a hash function which has algebraic prop-
erties. Thus, we avoid generic NIZK [6], gaining ef-
ficiency. More precisely, the message M is cut into
small blocks (m1‖ . . . ‖m`) of ρ bits, and the key is com-
puted as kM =
∏`
i=1 a
mi
i mod p for publicly known
ai’s. By using a variant of the leftover hash lemma [4],
we prove that if the messages come from a source with
high enough min-entropy, the key kM is indistinguish-
able from a uniform key.
Each block mi of the message is then encrypted using
the ElGamal encryption with messages in the exponent,
and the key kM :
T1,i = g
ri
i and T2,i = h
mi · gri·kMi . (1)
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These blocks mi are chosen small enough to be effi-
ciently decrypted.
It remains to create a suitable tag, which is done by
using the same technique as in [1]. More precisely, we
provide a pair (τ1 = t
u
1 , τ2 = t
u·kM
2 ), which will make it
possible to detect a duplication using a pairing compu-
tation. The consistency of the tag computation is done
by verifying the following equations:
τ1 = t
u
1 and (2)
e(τ1, t2)
kM = e(t1, τ2). (3)
To achieve deduplication consistency, we finally pro-
vide a NIZK proof that everything is well-formed: the
key (according to the message), the tag (according to
the key) and the ElGamal ciphertexts (according to
both the message and the key). For this purpose, we
provide an additional commitment C of the mi’s:
C =
∏`
i=1
amii · xs = kM · xs mod p. (4)
The main point regarding our NIZK is that we need
to prove that the secret kM (as an exponent for the
groups G1 and GT ) involved in the tag, the commitment
and the ciphertexts is the same secret kM as the one
(as an element of the group Z∗p of order p) computed
from the message. Regarding the tag and the ElGamal
ciphertext (equations (1) to (3)), the key kM is seen as
an exponent, and we can thus use standard and efficient
ZK proofs a` la Schnorr, making them non-interactive
using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
As C = kM · xs =
∏`
i=1 a
mi
i · xs mod p, we can ef-
ficiently prove the correctness of the commitment. It
remains to make the link between the message and the
key. For this purpose, we make use of both equations (3)
and (4). More precisely, equation (3) can be rewritten
as:
e(τ1, t2)
C = e(t1, τ2)
xs . (5)
Proving equation (5) is true involves the use of a dou-
ble discrete logarithm. We use the techniques from [8]
which slightly alter the efficiency of our construction.
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